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POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IN JURY SELECTION*

George P. Fletchert
The values of equality and freedom are in constant tension, or so some
think. The more society stresses equality, the less freedom people have.
For example, Bruce Ackerman would abolish inheritance in his utopian
society to insure that every generation begins on an equal footing.' Many
commentators have advocated restrictions on pornography and hate speech
in order to protect the likely targets of these traditionally protected uses of
free speech.' Additionally, Catharine MacKinnon has invoked the principle of equality in the form of protecting disempowered minorities to argue
for a restriction on liberty and freedom.' Conversely, the more economic
freedom we exercise in the marketplace, the more likely we are to generate disturbing inequalities between the rich and the poor. Political theotake the tension between liberty and equality for
rists, understandably,
4
granted.

* This Article is based on a speech that Professor Fletcher delivered in January 1995 as part of
the Donahue Lecture Series. The Donahue Lecture Series is a program instituted by the Suffolk
University Law Review to commemorate the Honorable Frank J. Donahue, former faculty member,
trustee, and treasurer of Suffolk University. The Lecture Series serves as a tribute to Judge Donahue's
accomplishments in encouraging academic excellence at Suffolk University Law School. Each lecture
in the series is designed to address contemporary legal issues and expose the Suffolk University
community to outstanding authorities in various fields of law.
f Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See BRUCE A. ACKERmAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 202-07 (1980) (arguing
inheritance creates inequalities in future generations).
2. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 15-41, 105-07 (1993) (suggesting pornography dehumanizes and endangers women, and advocating restricting pornography and hate speech);
Bruce A. Taylor, Hard-CorePornography:A Proposalfor a Per Se Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 255,
281-82 (1988) (supporting rule making hard-core pornography per se illegal). See generally Andrea
Dworkin, PornographyIs a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REp. 55 (1988) (advocating laws restricting pornography because harmful to women).
3. See MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 71-110 (arguing that free expression damages social equality for women and minorities).
4. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 85 (1960) (noting in many respects liberty
produces inequality); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 164 (1974) (noting individuals'
voluntary actions overturn egalitarian principles over time).
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This tension has been by no means evident in cases involving the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the Supreme Court
of the United States has been wary of extending the principle of equal
protection to matters that bear directly on the perpetuation of entrenched
economic classes in American society.' Differential funding for public
schools, where some local communities support their schools more than
others, obviously impacts the distribution of wealth in the next generation.
Yet the Court has refused to interfere with these funding practices, regardless of how much they may disadvantage some groups of children.6 There
is, however, no restriction on the liberty to pick a school, either public or
private, that will further the relative chances of one's child for success."
Likewise, the Court will not meddle in the greatest inequality of all, the
inequality of opportunity that arises from the economic fortunes of one's
family. To this extent, liberty interests, the freedom and the economic
power to do what one wishes, are fully compatible with the reigning interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The brand of equality promoted by the Supreme Court actually enhances freedom of association.8 For example, desegregating schools increased
the opportunities for social contact among children of different races.
Further, by striking down statutes prohibiting interracial marriage, the
Court increased the marriage options for everyone without reducing
anyone's liberty.9 Perhaps white segregationists could conceptualize their
opposition to integrating schools as the freedom not to associate with other
races. But this claim of right, rejected by American history, is more in the
nature of an asserted right to a certain environment in which other people
behave according to their personal preferences. It is not a claim of personal freedom to act (or not to act) in a particular way.
The assumption of political theory of the contradiction between freedom
and equality is not borne out by the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
Yet the Court has begun, in the 1990s, to intrude heavily, though almost

5. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (declining to find indigent women seeking funding for medically unnecessary abortion members of disadvantaged class); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. DisL v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 27-29 (1973) (refusing to apply equal protection strict scrutiny
review to wealth classification); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1971) (upholding state
constitutional amendment that subjected low-income housing projects to referendum approval).
6. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 56-59 (concluding state legislatures best suited
to make taxing and educational decisions).
7. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (recognizing individual right to select
between public and private schooling).
8. Herbert Wechsler would have preferred to rest the entire law of racial desegregation on the
principle of freedom of association. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 34 (1959) (arguing segregation infringes on right of freedom of association).
9. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing racially-classified statute violates
freedom to marry).
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unwittingly, in a critical area of personal freedom. No institution is more
important to individual liberty than the criminal trial, where criminal defendants face the risk of imprisonment and perhaps even the death penalty.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy" certain rights, including the right to a "public
trial, by an impartial jury."'" Undoubtedly, the framers thought these
rights were essential to living freely in the American Republic. It never
would have occurred to them that these freedoms, protected as rights,
might someday be seen as standing in conflict with the principle of equality. Yet within the last decade, in the area of jury selection, the Court has
discovered that there is indeed a conflict in criminal trials between freedom and equality. In their wisdom, the Supreme Court justices have decided, at least for the time being, that equality should prevail."
The Bill of Rights contained no contradiction between freedoms protected as rights and equality, for the first ten amendments studiously ignore the principle of equality. It was only after the Civil War, when the
Fourteenth Amendment cemented the Union victory, that this glaring
omission became corrected. For the first time, in the Fourteenth Amendment, we find the principle essential to any modem constitution: "No state
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' 2
Within fifteen years of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court intervened in the process of jury selection by striking
down, as a violation of equal protection of the laws, a West Virginia statute prohibiting blacks from serving on juries. 3 Significantly, Strauder, an
African-American, properly complained of being tried by a jury that the
law required to be all white. 4 The Court readily concluded that "[t]he
very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied.., all
right to participate in the administration of the law .. . though they are
citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand
upon them ....an assertion of their inferiority . .. ."1 When the Court
wrote this language in 1879 it had no trouble invalidating the statute that
prohibited "colored people" from serving on juries. 6 The primary focus
of the decision, however, was that the statute denied equal protection to

10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. See infra notes 27-68 and accompanying text (discussing jury selection cases in which equality outweighed freedom).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (concluding statute denied blacks'
right to equal protection because racially discriminatory).
14. Ld.
at 304.
15. Id at 308.
16. See id at 309-10 (deeming statute unconstitutionally discriminatory against "colored man").
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Strauder, an African-American, because the jury that would judge him
would very likely include men who would be hostile to his race. 7 The
Court extolled jury trials, in William Blackstone's words, as "trial by the
peers of every Englishman, and... the grand bulwark of his liberties...
secured to him by the Great Charter."'" The Court also took note of
widespread prejudice against emancipated blacks and concluded that stacking the jury with whites invariably would be detrimental to the proper
enjoyment of the right to trial by jury."
The Court did not mention the Sixth Amendment, for at that time in
history the Bill of Rights was not yet perceived to be applicable to the
states. This development came much later when, in the twentieth century,
the Court began reading the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more expansively." The important point about this first decision in
the area is that there was no tension between the values of equal protection and the Court's commitment to insuring the black defendant a fair
trial. Simply put, discrimination in the jury selection made the trial unfair.
In this century, the Court progressively invalidated other laws that restricted jury service. 2' Today, virtually any discrimination against adult
citizens in the composition of the pool or the venire, the list from which
attorneys choose jurors, would be invalid.2" None of these changes in any
way compromises the defendant's rights, and indeed the changes only
improve the chances of a fair trial for members of minority groups.
The defendant's rights come into play at the moment that jury selection
begins for a particular trial. At that point, the prosecution and defense
counsel, together with the trial judge, interview prospective jurors and
challenge those they regard as biased or potentially biased.' The judge

17. See id. at 308-09 (noting prejudice, which could influence jurors, existed in community).
18. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1879); 4 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-43 (1769).
19. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-09 (noting blacks denied equal protection when tried by all
white, prejudicial jury).
20. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968) (holding Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
17-19 (1967) (concluding Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process incorporated in Fourteenth
Amendment); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967) (holding Sixth Amendment
right to speedy trial
applicable to states).
21. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1972) (declaring unconstitutional
jury selection process that recorded race on forms used by jury commissioners); Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (holding grand jury selection process by which commissioners could disqualify
persons for lack of "intelligence" or "uprightness" unconstitutional); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,
599 (1935) (holding jury selection process unconstitutional that recorded race and allowed continuous
and total exclusion of blacks from juries).
22. See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 51-76 (1977) (surveying Supreme Court decisions regarding discrimination in procedures of jury selection).
23. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 20(b)(l) (setting forth rules for examining potential jurors).
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decides whether there is "cause" to dismiss the potential juror from service
in that case. 4 After using these challenges for cause, both sides to the
trial may invoke "peremptory challenges" to remove jurors whom they
suspect of bias but as to whom they cannot convince the judge that their
intuitions are correct.25 The use of peremptory challenges in particular
trials has now become the battleground for the tension between equality
and liberty.
The problem arises because both sides can use their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. They can remove all blacks, all whites,
all men, all Jews, all people who go to church, all people who read the
National Enquirer, or any other group they think would be inclined to
vote against their preferred outcome of the case. Of course, if prosecutors
used peremptory challenges consistently against a particular group, then
that practice would be tantamount to a law that precluded that group from
jury service.27 As we have seen, laws of that sort are patently unconstitutional.' It is not surprising then, that in 1965, the Court concluded that
the systematic use in all cases of peremptory challenges against AfricanAmericans was tantamount to a law disqualifying them from jury service,
and the practice of systematic discrimination was, therefore, flatly unconstitutional.' Note, however, that the discrimination condemned in this
1965 case applies across the board, regardless of tactical advantages in
particular cases of having people on the jury who would be likely to be
sympathetic or unsympathetic to the defense.
As of the early 1980s, the law made sense. There could be no wholesale discrimination, either by statute or in practice, in the selection of the
venire or pool from which the attorneys chose the jury; the attorneys could
not categorically disqualify a group of citizens from jury service on the
grounds of ethnicity, gender, race, religion or any other demographic
marker. Yet the retail, individualized selection of juries in particular

24. Id. 20(b)(3).
25. See id. 20(c) (outlining peremptory challenge procedure).
26. See, e.g., .E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct 1419, 1421-22 (1994) (determining
whether prosecution may use peremptory strikes to exclude jurors because of gender); Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (1992) (deciding whether criminal defendant prohibited from racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (addressing evidentiary standard for criminal defendant who claims use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges).
27. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965) (indicating unconstitutionality of
prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries).
28. See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 51-76 (outlining unconstitutional discriminatory practices in
jury selection).
29. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24 (recognizing consistent removal of African-Americans from all
juries denies them right to participate on juries).
30. See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 51-76 (discussing cases invalidating unconstitutional jury
selection procedures).
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cases remained in the hands of the prosecutor and defense counsel, and
they could make whatever tactical judgments they desired about selecting
jurors in particular cases. If they used their peremptory challenges against
people who, according to their psychological profiles of jury behavior,
would be likely to vote against them, that was a decision relegated to their
professional judgment. In 1986, however, the Court confronted a case that
seemed like an easy extension of existing law, and thereby unwittingly fell
into a morass of problems that can hardly yield satisfying solutions.3
In Batson v. Kentucky,32 the Court began applying the principle of
nondiscrimination in jury selection to particular cases and thus ushered in
a new and uncertain jurisprudence.33 The prosecutor in Batson had dismissed four African-Americans without any apparent rationale except the
likelihood that because of their race they would sympathize with the African-American defendant.' The Court held that when a pattern of discrimination emerges, "the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a
neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."3 The Court reaffirmed
the long standing principle that "a defendant has no right to a 'petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race."' Yet in the
Batson case, the Court undertook to supervise the tendency of lawyers-for now, just the prosecution-to engage in unfair or invidious
discrimination in selecting the jury for particular cases.37
The problem with addressing discrimination in the selection of particular juries is that the activity is, by its nature, discriminatory. Lawyers want
some people on the jury and not others. It is perfectly sensible to conclude, as did the Court in Batson, that when the prosecution discriminates
against people who look like the defendant, the defendant is less likely to
get a fair trial. This conduct is not discrimination against the jurors who
do not get to serve, but against the defendant's interest in maintaining his
liberty. Rulings in this vein favor equality and liberty at the same time.
The Batson Court could have invoked at least two rationales for its
decision. It could have focused on the accused's right to a fair trial and an
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment as applied to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3" Alternatively,
31. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (mandating courts to become sensitive to use
of peremptory challenges in racially discriminatory manner).
32. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
33. See id. at 96-98 (announcing that use of peremptory challenges at defendant's trial establishes
prima facie case of discrimination).
34. Id. at 83. Because of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, the jury consisted of only
white persons. Id.
35. Id. at 97.
36. Id. at 85 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879)).
37. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (requiring supervision of prosecution's use of
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges).
38. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing application of Sixth Amendment funda-
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the Court could have invoked the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and placed the case in the line of development that
began with the Strauder case.3 9
Batson himself had argued the case in the lower courts on the ground
of fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.' Batson asserted that it was
unfair to try the case without members of his own race having a fair opportunity at sitting on the jury.4 ' But why is this unfair? Are we to presume that whites, Asians, and Hispanics, properly chosen for the jury, cannot judge him impartially? If that is the case, an African-American defendant should have the right to a jury composed entirely of African-Americans. If that is true, however, all defendants should be tried by a jury consisting of solely their race. It should follow that when the State tried Officer Laurence Powell and his three fellow officers for beating up Rodney
King, they had a right to an all white jury. As is well known, that is essentially what happened in Simi Valley, and the inner-city community
reacted in outrage.
If the requirement of a fair trial is too elusive to provide a grounding
for the decision, then the better argument should be the anti-discrimination
principle. To the chagrin of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
the Batson Court in fact turned away from Batson's Sixth Amendment
argument, and rested the decision squarely on the anti-discrimination principle of the Equal Protection Clause.42
The paradox of relying on the anti-discrimination principle in this context is that we are not entirely sure whom the judicial system is discriminating against. Is it the African-American defendant or the African-American jurors who are prevented from serving on the jury by the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges? The majority opinion by Justice Powell
seeks to slide off the prongs of this dilemma with the following artful
sentences: "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond
that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire
community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons
from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
'
justice."43
This passage follows a discussion of the evils of discrimination in se-

mental rights to states).
39. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310 (concluding statute prohibiting blacks from jury service violative of
Equal Protection Clause).
40. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
41. Id.
42. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 112-16 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (noting Batson
specifically disclaimed reliance on Equal Protection Clause); id. at 137 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting)
(disputing majority's use of Equal Protection Clause to limit scope of peremptory challenges).
43. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
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lecting the venire, the panel from which the attorneys eventually choose
the twelve persons on the jury." The cornerstone of the Batson decision
seems to be that the principles applicable to the selection of the venire are
applicable to the selection of the individual jurors who should serve.'
The principles that had become true for the wholesale selection of the
venire were now also true for the retail selection of the twelve jury members. Or were they? Could the Court actually make good on its promise to
eliminate discrimination in jury service?
Batson left a nagging problem in its wake. If the prosecution could not
discriminate on the basis of race, did that mean the defense could not do
so either? Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, the two dissenters in
Batson, anticipated the temptation to apply the principle of non-discrimination to the defense and found in this danger an argument against entering the field altogether. '
The problem of discrimination by the defense did not reach the Supreme Court until the winter of 1992."7 In Georgia v. McCollum," a
case structurally similar to the Rodney King trial then gearing up in Los
Angeles, involving a white defendant charged with assaulting AfricanAmerican victims, the prosecution sought a pre-trial order preventing the
defense from using peremptory challenges on the basis of race.49 In
Dougherty County, Georgia, forty-three percent of the population was African-American. 0 A non-discriminatory selection of the jury would have
practically assured the participation of some African-American jurors.5"
Of course, the defense would have preferred an all-white jury that might
sympathize with a white man engaged in a racially motivated assault. 2
After the trial judge denied the State's motion to prohibit the defense from
using peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the defense would have been able to secure a jury without a singe AfricanAmerican. 3 This seemed unfair, but it was difficult for the Court to find

44. See id. at 86-87 (discussing effects of purposeful racial discrimination in venire selection).
45. See id. at 88-89 (recognizing principles of Equal Protection Clause equally applicable to selection of jury members).
46. Id. at 125-26 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (noting majority's hybrid approach applicable to defense and limitation on usefulness of peremptory challenges).
47. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992) (discussing constitutionality of
criminal defendant purposefully exercising peremptory challenges on racial basis).
48. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
49. Id. at 2351; see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 37-68 (1995) (providing detailed study of Rodney King case).
50. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2351.
51. Id. Georgia statutory law requires a panel of 42 persons in felony cases. Id. at 2351 n.1. Accordingly, a statistically representative panel would have consisted of 18 potential African-American
jurors. Id. at 2351.
52. See id. (noting defense counsel's indication of intent to use challenges on racial basis).
53. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2351-52 (1992) (noting judge's denial of State's
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a principle for fairly restricting the options of the defense to select the
most sympathetic jury it could find.54
Again the problem arises. Discrimination by the defense may seem
unfair, but unfair to whom? To the prosecution? American lawyers are
reluctant to recognize that the prosecution has rights under the Constitution. There is no liberty interest that is compromised when the prosecution
loses the right to discriminate. Is it unfair to victims like Rodney King and
those who identify with him? It is indeed, but American courts do not take
the rights of victims seriously.55 The new view that began to crystallize
in the Supreme Court was that the discriminatory harm accrued to the
jurors who could not serve.56 The Court reconceptualized jury service
from a duty of citizenship to a right of participation.57
Denial of the right to participate on a jury on the ground of race began
to appear comparable to the denial of the right to vote. 8 In an important
transition case, the Court commented, "[i]ndeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process." 9 The
upshot of this reorientation was that in the summer of 1992, the Court
held by five votes to four that the defense could not inflict harm on potential African-American jurors by excluding them solely on the grounds of
their race.' Notably, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion
arguing that in the long run the decision will be deleterious to the liberty
interests of African-American defendants.6 1 The decision implied that
black defendants could no longer use peremptory challenges against whites
in order to secure a jury likely, on grounds of racial and cultural loyalty,
to be sympathetic to them.62 Although, in Justice Thomas' view, the liberty of black defendants was at stake, the majority held that the principle
of equality took precedence.
The new philosophy of jury selection became disturbingly transparent in

motion enabled defense to remove all African-Americans from jury pool).
54. See id. at 2357-59 (discussing defendant's constitutional rights regarding peremptory challenges).
55. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 9-148 (elaborating on issue of courts' disregard for
victims' rights).
56. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-10 (1991) (discussing effects of discriminatory exclusion on individual jurors).
57. See id. at 406-07 (describing racial exclusion of qualified persons as foreclosing significant
opportunity to participate in democracy).
58. See id. at 407 (analyzing jury service with right to vote).
59. Id.
60. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (holding criminal defendants may
not purposefully racially discriminate by exercising peremptory challenges).
61. See id. at 2360 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (noting decision protects jurors but creates risks for defendants).
62. Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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April 1994, when the Court ruled that neither the prosecution nor the
defense could exclude men or women from a jury solely on the basis of
gender (or sex, as the New York Times insists on saying). 3 In a suit to
establish the defendant's paternity and his obligation to pay child support,
the State used nine of its ten peremptory challenges to remove male jurors.6 The prosecution assumed that women would be more likely than
men to impose liability for child support.65 The defense engaged in the
reverse tactic and struck the female candidates.' Because there were
more women in the pool, however, the jury ultimately consisted of only
females, who eventually found the defendant liable.67 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, six Justices agreed with the
defendant's contention that allowing an all-female jury to judge him violated his constitutional right to the equal protection of the laws."
The defendant won his appeal, but the opinion contains only a passing
reference to the harm that discrimination caused the male defendant.'
The Justices devoted all of their rhetorical energy to a recitation of past
discriminatory practices toward women.7' It is true that women gained
the right to vote and to participate in juries later than African-American
men did. It took the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 to universalize the
suffrage, and as of 1947, sixteen states still denied women the right to jury
service.7 This discrimination, the Court reasoned, was based on stereotypical presumptions about the competence and biases of women.' These
assumptions about men and women and their propensities "reflect and
reinforce patterns of historical discrimination."7' 3 When lawyers rely on
their intuition about men and women, they reinforce the historical pattern
of discrimination against women.74
It is understandable, then, that the Court said almost nothing about
whether it was fair to the defendant in this particular case to be tried by

63. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (holding gender discrimination in jury selection unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause).
64. Id. at1421-22.
65. Id. at 1426.
66. Id. at 1422.
67. Id.
68. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994).
69. See id. at 1426 (quoting Respondent's Brief at 10, J.E.B. (No. 92-1239)) (noting claim that
women jurors may be less sympathetic to defendants in paternity cases).
70. See id. at 1422-24 (discussing historical discrimination against women serving on juries).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (prohibiting denial of right to vote on basis of gender);
J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1423 n.3 (discussing slow progression of women's suffrage).
72. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422-25 (analyzing historical reasons for discriminating against
women on juries).
73. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994).
74. See id. (noting summarily excluding jurors on basis of gender encourages historical discrimination).
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an all female jury. Any implication that a jury composed of primarily or
exclusively women would show partiality to a female complainant would
reinforce the stereotype that women and men think differently about certain issues. To avoid this tempting (and in my view reasonable) conclusion, the Court had to assume that the State violated the constitutional
rights of the men whom the prosecution excluded from serving on the
jury. It is unclear why this defendant, having received a fair and impartial
trial, should secure a reversal of the judgment against him just because the
prosecution violated the rights of some other unnamed men.
Curiously, in this line of cases, the most conservative Justices, Scalia,
Rehnquist, Thomas, and O'Connor, take on the role of the defendant's
champion. Those accused of committing a crime should be able to maximize the possibility of a favorable verdict by striking whomever they
wish. In this situation, these Justices favor liberty over equality. Yet the
same Justices often vote to curtail the rights of the accused.75 In the hierarchy of values in the 1990s, liberals and conservatives gravitate toward
unfamiliar positions. For liberals, the imperative to extend equal protection
to disadvantaged groups trumps the rights of criminal defendants. It is
more important to root out stereotypes about women and ethnic groups
than it is to protect the traditional options of the accused. For conservatives, the historically rooted conception of a fair trial does not surrender to
the new egalitarian politics that seeks to ban "stereotypical presumptions
that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical discrimination."7 6
The Supreme Court has spoken. It is not, however, clear that lawyers
are willing to listen. Virtually all the speculation about choosing jurors for
the O.J. Simpson trial focused on race and gender. The New York Times
Magazine quoted Robert Shapiro, Simpson's lead defense counsel, as
saying that he wanted an "[aill women, mixed race" jury.77 Maybe
Shapiro thinks that women will lean toward leniency, as they did in the
hung jury for Erik Menendez." Or perhaps he has the same intuition as
Linda Fairstein, head of the sex crimes division in the Manhattan District
Attorney's office, who has stated that "when the defendant is attractive,
articulate and a celebrity, women more than men tend, unfortunately, to
base their verdict on external appearances. ' 79 Because Simpson is an at75. See, e.g., Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (1994) (holding due process permits
consideration of previous misdemeanor conviction when sentencing for felony); Schad v. Arizona, 501
U.S. 624, 647-48 (1991) (upholding accused's conviction when jury instructions did not require agreement on alternative theories); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181-82 (1991) (holding accused's
invocation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel in judicial proceeding not Miranda invocation).
76. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428.
77. Bella Stumbo, Bobby and O.J. and Howard and Michael and Johnnie and Liz, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 76.
78. See Maura Dolan, Jury Is Out on the Role of Gender, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al (noting women jurors urged for sentencing for lesser crime).
79. David Margolick, Ideal Jurorfor O.J. Simpson: FootballFan Who Can Listen, N.Y. TIMES,

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX: I

tractive defendant, the rest apparently follows.
Linda Fairstein and Robert Shapiro are speculating out of bounds. They
should not be thinking about whether women are lenient or whether they
are attracted to good-looking defendants. All of this smacks, in the Supreme Court's reasoning, "of the arguments advanced to justify the total
exclusion of women from juries."' The only way to root out discrimination, apparently, is to change the way lawyers think.
Lawyers, however, have not gotten the message. They are still politically incorrect. Shapiro is most incorrect of all; he even complimented prosecutor Marcia Clark for having "great legs."'" He and his fellow lawyers
still pick juries the way they used to, by relying on gut intuitions and by
hiring consulting firms who do nothing but trade in stereotypes. The
consultants' multi-factorial analysis is more sophisticated than generalizations based solely on gender, but the difference is a matter of degree.
There is no way to predict jury behavior, but you can locate people in
categories and make statistical predictions based on common experience
with people of those categories. In other words, lawyers predict by generating nuanced stereotypes that are only marginally better than those condemned by the Court.
What has gone wrong here? Why do lawyers refuse to listen to the
politically correct wisdom coming from the Supreme Court? For one
thing, they have a job to do. Neither the prosecution nor the defense has
time to worry whether its tactics, in the Court's words, "ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women." 2 Of
course, if Shapiro had used his peremptory challenges against men in
order to secure an all-female jury, he would have had to devise a genderneutral pretext to support his challenge. Though his thinking is not politically correct, his mode of action, at least in court, must conform to the
Supreme Court's dictates.
The mistake here is not of the lawyers' making. Advocates use their
wits in their clients' interests. The problem lies with the Court. The Justices have gotten carried away with their own passion to reform society. It
might be nice for everyone to stop making generalizations about the sympathies of blacks, whites, Jews, gentiles, men, and women. Trials, however, are about convicting the guilty and preserving the freedom of the innocent. They are not about the pursuit of egalitarian ideals.
In 1986, when the Court first embarked on this campaign to reform jury
selection, it made a wrong turn. It should have stuck with Batson's own

Sept. 23, 1994, at Al.
80. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1994).
81. Stumbo, supra note 77, at 76.
82. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
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argument that the State denied him a fair trial. The trial was unfair because as an African-American man, he was entitled to a jury that gave his
own people, African-Americans, a fair crack at sitting in judgment of his
actions. Then we ask the converse question: Did Rodney King have a
right to a fair crack at having African-Americans sit in judgment of his
complaint against the Los Angeles Police Department? The answer is yes.
Of course, the Supreme Court has said over and over again that no
defendant has a "right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of
persons of his own race."' 83 As defendants have no right to racial representation, victims like Rodney King have no right to members of their
race on the jury. Accordingly, when ruling to prohibit the defense's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the Justices rested their case on
the problem of discrimination against the excluded jurors."' This is criminal justice, 1990s style. "Anti-discrimination" sells better than "victims'
rights."
The proper rationale for promoting minority group representation in
jury deliberations is insuring a fair trial to the defendant as well as to the
prosecution and to the victim. My argument for fairness is not based on a
prediction about particular groups and how they will vote in the jury
room. The point of seeking a representative jury is rather to guard against
prejudiced comments in the deliberations. Anna Deavere Smith reports a
post-verdict interview with Maria, the black postal worker who sat on the
federal Rodney King trial.8 5 Maria disclosed that when the jurors came
down for breakfast in the hotel where they were sequestered, some of
them said, in effect, "it's a shame to spend so much money on the likes of
that man."' Maria properly sensed that this not-so-veiled derision toward
Rodney King could make a difference in the deliberations, and she protested by putting an end to it. She objected as a black woman and halted
the slide toward what she perceived as race- and class-based slurs.
The proper way to structure juries in our time is not even to seek to
eliminate stereotypes. We should recognize that men and women are often
different. Blacks, whites, and Asian-Americans are often different. Jews
and Christians are often different. The European-born and American-born
are often different.
This claim would not be a surprise to many people in the academy.
Difference-feminists, building on Carol Gilligan's work, argue that one

83. Id. at 1421 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879)).
84. See id. at 1430 (announcing that denial of equal opportunity to serve on juries violative of
Equal Protection Clause).
85. ANNA D. SMrm, TWILIGHT: LOS ANGELES, 1992 (1994). The interview with "Maria" (last
name not given) is not included in the published version of the play. The quotations are based on my
recollections of the performance at the Cort Theatre in New York, April-May, 1994.
86. Id.
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should expect men and women to think differently about a wide range of
issues." They would not at all be surprised by the breakdown of the
hung jury in the Menendez trial. Six women accepted Menendez' tale of
abuse and voted for manslaughter. 8 Six men held out for the more severe
verdict of murder.89 Critical race theorists stress our divergent experiences in American culture as a basis for assuming different sympathies and
loyalties in different racial and ethnic groups.' In the academy, at least,
stereotypes are in. The Supreme Court may be trying to be politically
correct in its call to eliminate all stereotypes from jury selection. Their
version of political correctness is, however, a partial view. There are many
sensible modems who disagree.
The Supreme Court speaks and nobody listens. The folly of the Justices
reminds one of the effort by the Warren Court to regulate police conduct
with the exclusionary rule. In Mapp v. Ohio,9 the Court, together with
legions of supporters in academia, thought they could discipline and shape
the conduct of the police by excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence.' The Court spoke, but the police did not listen. If we ever had
doubts on the score, all we need to do is reflect on the behavior of the
Los Angeles police in the Simpson case. They were outside the wall of
Simpson's estate in the early morning of June 13, 1994.9' They had just
investigated the double murder of Simpson's ex-wife Nicole and her friend
Ronald Goldman a half mile away.94 They had reason to think that
Simpson might have done it. They could have used their car radios to
secure a warrant in a matter of minutes. With a warrant based on their
apparent probable cause they could have searched the premises of the
estate in full compliance with the constitutional requirements.
They chose instead to scale the wall and investigate on their own. Never mind the Fourth Amendment. They would worry about legal niceties

87. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VoicE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982) (discussing differences between women and men in thought, speech,
lives, conceptions, experiences, identity, and morality).
88. Dolan, supra note 78, at Al.
89. Dolan, supra note 78, at Al.
90. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA.
L. REv. 95, 97-98 (1990) (criticizing view that critical race theorists homogenize nonwhites); Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 807, 809-10 (1993) (noting critical race theorists embrace idea that different backgrounds lead
to disparate beliefs and attitudes); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction,
82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 760-62 (1994) (discussing critical race theorists' recognition of social movement
members' differences).
91. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
92. See id. at 660 (holding police may not suspend Due Process Clause when seizing evidence).
93. Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Simpson Evidence Can Be Used, Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES, July
8, 1994, at A .
94. Id.
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after the fact. They ran the risk of blowing the case that was already
brewing as one of the biggest of the decade. They found the incriminating
bloody glove and other evidence, but then came the problem of getting it
all admitted into evidence.95 The police had to devise an argument to circumvent the case law. They claimed that they were not interested in
searching the grounds of the estate, but merely in securing the safety of
other people who might have been in danger.' Of course, the camouflage
worked.' In a case of this magnitude, the court was not prepared to let
the defendant go because the police had blundered.
With their argument that gave lip service to the Supreme Court's rulings, the prosecution, arguing on behalf of the police, behaved exactly as
lawyers do when they seek non-racial and non-gender based reasons for
exercising their peremptory challenges. Plus Va change, plus c'est la mome
chose. [The more things change, the more they are the same.] The Supreme Court speaks and lawyers listen, but only to devise arguments to
circumvent the Court's efforts to reform society.
In its rulings on jury selection, the Supreme Court has entered upon
terrain mined with pitfalls. It sounds good to rule against racial and sexual
discrimination, but the Court should first have surveyed the dangers that
lie ahead. No one knows whether the new jurisprudence of equality will
extend to other demographic markers that dominate jury selection. In May
1994, the Court refused to hear an appeal from a Minnesota decision permitting prosecutorial discrimination on the basis of religion.9 The prosecutor had struck a man from the jury who professed to be a Jehovah's
Witness.9 The prosecutor explained her decision as flowing from her
experience that members of this sect are "reluctant to exercise authority
over their fellow human beings."'" Her thinking obviously leveled all
members of the group to the same stereotype, yet for the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, this was all right.' The Supreme Court of the United
States shied away from the case presumably because they could hardly
agree about which stereotypes are so offensive as to be unconstitutional
and which are not."l

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. (discussing court's decision to permit introduction of evidence found on Simpson's
estate).
98. See Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. CL 2120 (1994), denying cert. to State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767 (Minn. 1993).
99. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 768.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 771-72 & n.5 (holding striking Jehovah's Witness not improper because religious
bigotry not historical basis of jury discrimination).
102. See Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (disagreeing with dissent's characterization of religious affiliations); id. at 2121-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing protection should
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Yet this is the kind of discrimination that, if applied to the selection of
the jury venire, would encounter swift judicial nullification. 3 A law that
prohibited homosexuals, Asians, Jews, or the handicapped from being in
the pool or the venire would not stand a chance in the Supreme Court. Yet
between the pool to the inner twelve, there is many a slip. The right to the
former becomes a chance at the latter. As we move from candidacy to
election, the law of discrimination becomes distorted. Neither side may
openly discriminate on the basis of race or gender. If this is all a fractured
Court can do, then we will be treated to debates in the lower courts about
whether, for these purposes, Hispanics are a race or an ethnic group and
whether Jews are a race, a religion, or something else (shades of Third
Reich!). Debates about the boundaries of "race" as a category hardly befit
a modem legal system.
This is just the first step into the thicket. How do we apply the Supreme Court's teaching to homosexuals? In the trial of Dan White, the
1978 assassin of Harvey Milk and George Moscone, could defense counsel
exclude all homosexuals from the jury? At the time, Doug Schmidt, the
lawyer for Dan White, managed to do just that."° Are stereotypical assumptions about homosexuals any less objectionable than those about
women? If we must live with the current state of the law, we will witness
the decline of a great legal system into the arbitrary allocation of protection from cultural stereotypes.
We are in this unhappy state because we are unsure of what we are
trying to accomplish by eliminating discrimination in jury selection. The
Court cannot correct the way the masses of people think about homosexuals, Jews, the old, the young, men, or women. We cannot achieve impartial juries by pretending there are no cultural differences that can imperceptibly spin a juror's judgment in a particular direction. It is far better to
balance the spin so that the forces offset each other. Both sides are entitled
to a fair trial and to a fair crack at having jurors among the twelve who
will lean in their direction, who will seek, as did Maria in the federal
Rodney King case, to insulate the jury against biased deliberations. The
Court should stop trying to reform the way people think. Instead, the Justices should open their eyes and perceive the richness of America as it
really is.

extend to religious classifications).
103. See VAN DYKE, supra note 22, at 45-83 (surveying decisions invalidating discrimination in
jury selection).
104. See FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 16 (noting White's attorney removed all suspected homosexuals from jury).

